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AN END RUN AROUND EMPLOYMENT OBSTACLES: 
SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS FOR 
RETURNING CITIZENS 
BY DYLAN ROGERS ELLIOTT* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The lives of two men, Wes and Clinton, demonstrate the im-
portance of employment for returning citizens1 during reentry and what 
happens if they cannot find work.2 Wes’s story became a national best-
seller in The Other Wes Moore.3 Clinton’s story is told in an academic 
work discussing criminal sanctions’ impacts on families.4 Both illustrate 
the issue this comment confronts. 
Semi-autobiographical and semi-biographical, The Other Wes 
Moore tells the stories of “two boys living in Baltimore with similar 
histories and an identical name: Wes Moore.”5 While Wes Moore, the 
author, escaped a challenging childhood to graduate college, become a 
                                                            
© 2019 Dylan Rogers Elliott 
*J.D. candidate, 2020, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
The author (he/him/his pronouns) thanks his mother and father, Kelly and Chris, for raising him 
to have an open mind and heart, his professors and colleagues at the University of Maryland, 
Baltimore County, and the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, who 
inspired both the author and this work, and the staff of the University of Maryland Law Journal 
of Race, Religion, Gender, and Class for their tireless work in bringing this comment to publi-
cation. 
1  This comment uses “returning citizens” to refer to those who have been incarcerated and are 
returning to society post-incarceration. “Returning citizen” is considered more inclusive and 
less stigma-associated than terms such as “ex-offender,” “ex-prisoner,” and “ex-felon.” See 
Priya Baskaran, Respect the Hustle: Necessity Entrepreneurship, Returning Citizens, and Social 
Enterprise Strategies, 78 MD. L. REV. 324, 325 n.4 (2019); Unlocking the Second Prison: 
Changing our Words to Help Returning Citizens, SHARED JUSTICE (Jul. 18, 2017) 
http://www.sharedjustice.org/most-recent/2017/7/18/unlocking-the-second-prison-changing-
our-words-to-help-returning-citizens. 
2 See generally WES MOORE, THE OTHER WES MOORE: ONE NAME TWO FATES (2010) (demon-
strating the importance of employment for returning citizens during reentry and what happens 
if they cannot find work); Donald Braman & Jenifer Wood, From One Generation to the Next: 
How Criminal Sanctions Are Reshaping Family Life in Urban America, in PRISONERS ONCE 
REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND 
COMMUNITIES 157, 171–74 (Jeremy West & Michelle Waul eds., 2003) (explaining criminal 
sanctions’ impacts on families). 
3 MOORE, supra note 2. 
4 Braman & Wood, supra note 2, at 171–74. 
5 MOORE, supra note 2, at xi. 
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Rhodes Scholar, and serve as a United States Army paratrooper,6  the 
“other” Wes Moore’s life led from a tumultuous childhood, through 
twists and turns, to a life sentence in prison for armed robbery.7 
At one of those twists, the “other” Wes Moore turned his back 
on the drug trade and attended Job Corps,8 a federal program teaching 
job skills.9 Despite finding a craft—carpentry—that he enjoyed and 
found meaningful,10 Wes discovered that within a year of completing 
Job Corps the meager salaries he made in his collection of temporary 
jobs was not enough to support himself and his children.11 Wes reluc-
tantly reentered the drug trade to make the money needed to support 
himself and his children.12 
Clinton’s story is similar. Upon his release from incarceration 
for selling drugs, Clinton was determined to legitimately support his 
family.13 For about six months Clinton achieved that goal working in a 
department store.14 Unfortunately, Clinton’s new life unraveled when 
the store closed and he lost his job.15 His subsequent job applications 
were rejected, which he blames on his forthrightness regarding his crim-
inal record.16 Employer discrimination against returning citizens ob-
structs returning citizens from obtaining employment17 and it likely 
doomed Clinton’s reentry. Unable to find work, he transitioned from 
supporting his family to being supported by them.18 After several 
months with no job or paycheck, Clinton returned to “hustling” (selling 
drugs) to make money for himself and his family.19 Caught between his 
“commitment to [financially] help out” his family and his inability to 
find legal employment, Clinton ended up reincarcerated.20 
Wes Moore and Clinton’s stories go to the heart of a major ob-
stacle facing returning citizens upon reentry: finding employment. In 
                                                            
6 Id. at xi, 135. 
7 Id. at xi–ii. 
8 Id. at 140. 
9 Id. at 139. 
10  MOORE, supra note 2, at 142–43. 
11 Id. at 145. 
12 Id. 
13 Braman & Wood, supra note 2, at 171. The family Clinton was determined to support was 
sizeable and consisted of his sister, her two daughters, his longtime girlfriend, his daughter, and 
his granddaughter. Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 172. 
16 Id. 
17 See infra Part II-A. 
18 Braman & Wood, supra note 2, at 172. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 173. 
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the United States, where 2.3 million people are incarcerated,21 over 
600,000 people are released from prison each year.22 Employment is 
critical to whether a returning citizen will be able to avoid recidivating.23 
Avoiding recidivism is important for the wellbeing of the individual, 
their family, their community, and larger society.24 
This comment advocates small business development programs 
as a solution to the employment obstacles facing returning citizens. The 
programs will help returning citizens either develop their own small 
business or help them obtain employment with returning citizen owned 
businesses established through the program.25 Part II explains the obsta-
cles that prevent returning citizens from obtaining employment, and un-
employment’s effects on individuals, families, communities, and soci-
ety. Part III considers existing approaches to remedying the obstacles 
and evaluates their shortcomings. Finally, Part IV advocates small busi-
ness development programs as a workaround to Part III’s incomplete 
solutions and proposes a hypothetical framework for what those pro-
grams should look like. 
II. THE OBSTACLES TO EMPLOYMENT: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, AND THEIR IMPACTS 
Collateral consequence and employment discrimination are ob-
stacles that make it difficult, or outright impossible, for returning citi-
zens to obtain employment during reentry. Inability to find work leads 
to an increased risk of recidivism for returning citizens.26 When return-
ing citizens recidivate, everyone suffers: recidivating individuals, fami-
lies, communities, and society.27 This section looks at the obstacles to 
employment, explains how those obstacles result in a higher likelihood 
of recidivism, and considers the damage this causes. 
                                                            
21 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POLICY 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html. An estimated 
1,316,000 are incarcerated in state prisons, 615,000 are incarcerated in local jails, and 225,000 
are incarcerated in federal prisons and jails. Id. 
22 E. Ann Carson & Elizabeth Anderson, Prisoners in 2015, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 11, 2016), 
https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf. In 2015, 641,027 prisoners were released; in 2014, 
636,346 prisoners were released. Id. 
23 See infra Part II-B. 
24 See infra Part II-C. 
25 See infra Part IV. 
26 Sandra J. Mullings, Employment of Ex-Offenders: The Time Has Come for a True Antidis-
crimination Statute, 64 Syracuse L. Rev. 261, 265 (2014). 
27 See infra Part II-C. 
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A. OBSTACLES TO EMPLOYMENT: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Collateral consequences, of which employment discrimination 
is a subset,28 ensure that individuals continue to feel the impact of a sen-
tence after they have completed their term of incarceration. They are a 
“host of sanctions and disqualifications that can place an unanticipated 
burden on individuals trying to re-enter society and lead lives as citi-
zens,”29 taking the form of “penalties, restrictions, and disabilities” scat-
tered throughout federal and state law.30 Collateral consequences are in-
frequently part of the penal code, but instead are nestled in different 
statutes ranging from gun-ownership laws, to voting laws, to welfare 
requirements.31 
Alternatively, employment discrimination is not a statutory 
measure, although some statutes forbid former prisoners from obtaining 
occupational licenses.32 Rather, employment discrimination consists of 
employers discriminating against returning citizens by either discourag-
ing or outright rejecting returning citizen job applications because of 
criminal records.33 Employment discrimination, and collateral conse-
quences generally, has been criticized as unfair,34 with Jeremy Travis, 
an advocate for criminal justice reform, describing the regime as a 
“brave new world, [in which] punishment for the original offense is no 
longer enough; one’s debt to society is never paid.”35 
Collateral consequences, despite their pervasiveness, are not a 
recent invention.36 The ancient Athenians, Romans, and some Germanic 
                                                            
28 Mullings, supra note 26, at 265. 
29 Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral Consequences, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE (2013), https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateral-consequences.aspx. 
30 Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in Amer-
ican Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 145 (2008). 
31 Id. 
32 Mullings, supra note 26, at 268. 
33 Michael Carlin & Ellen Frick, Criminal Records, Collateral Consequences, and Employ-
ment: the FCRA and Title VII in Discrimination Against Persons with Criminal Records, 12 
Seattle J. Soc. Just. 109, 112–13 (2013). 
34 Mullings, supra note 26, at 265. 
35 Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 19 (Marc Mauer 
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Jeremy Travis, ARNOLD VENTURES, LLC, https://www.ar-
noldventures.org/people/jeremy-travis/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 37–38. 
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tribes all had punishments that excluded an individual from society for-
ever.37 These deprived the punished of certain rights associated with cit-
izenship or membership in the community.38 Such punitive concepts 
persisted through the medieval period and were incorporated into our 
nascent nation by our colonial ancestors.39 What has changed is how 
prevalent they are in the United States.40 Although modern contempo-
raries, such as England, Canada, and South Africa, impose collateral 
consequences, none do so on the same scale as the United States.41 The 
National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction esti-
mates that there are over 40,000 collateral consequences in the United 
States, with approximately 29,000 related to employment.42 Some “col-
lateral consequences serve a legitimate public safety or regulatory func-
tion,” such as “prohibiting people convicted of assault or physical abuse 
from working with children,”43 but others apply blindly, making no con-
nection between crime and restriction, or ignoring the length of time 
elapsed since the conviction.44 Efforts to reform collateral consequences 
should obviously focus on the latter, not the former. 
Employment discrimination is similarly widespread: a study 
conducted in the 1990s of 3,000 employers in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, 
and Los Angeles found that 20% of employers “definitely would not 
hire” an applicant with a criminal record and an additional 42% of em-
ployers “probably would not hire” an applicant with a criminal record.45 
                                                            
37 Travis, supra note 35, at 17. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.; Project Description, NAT’L INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION, https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Resources/Ref/CollConsequenceProjDescrip-
2012.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2018). 
40 See infra text accompanying notes 41–42. 
41 Mullings, supra note 26, at 265; see Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 21, for an estimation of 
how many Americans are incarcerated. 
42 CSJ Justice Center, Collateral Consequences Inventory, NAT’L INVENTORY OF 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/database/re-
sults/?jurisdiction=&consequence_ 
category=236%2C234%2C377&narrow_category=&triggering_offense_category=&conse-
quence_type=&duration_category=&page_number=1 (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). The approx-
imation of 29,000 employment related collateral consequences was obtained by filtering “Con-
sequence Type” by three filters: “Business licensure & participation,” “Employment & 
volunteering,” and “Occupational & professional licensure & certification.” Id. 
43 CSJ Justice Center, About, NAT’L INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
44 Id. 
45 Harry J. Holzer et al., Working Discussion Paper for The Urban Institute’s Reentry 
Roundtable: Can Employers Play a More Positive Role in Prisoner Reentry? 14 (Mar. 20–
21, 2002) (Urban Inst. Reentry Roundtable), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publi-
cation/60761/410803-Can-Employers-Play-a-More-Positive-Role-in-Prisoner-Reentry-
.PDF. The statistics cited were originally collected by Harry Holzer in the 1990s. Id. at 4 n.3. 
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A 2013 study found that 24% of responding Michigan employers would 
not consider applications from returning citizens “at all.”46 Since an es-
timated 87% of employers rely on criminal background checks when 
evaluating applications, 47 it appears that employment discrimination 
against returning citizens is widespread. Furthermore, scholars suggest 
that employers’ unwillingness to hire returning citizens is higher today 
than in the past.48 
The obstacles to returning citizen employment are pervasive, ex-
isting as both official state discrimination against returning citizens and 
as unofficial private employer discrimination.49  Such obstacles ad-
versely impact a returning citizen’s chances of obtaining employment 
and increase the chance of recidivism.50 
B. WHY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION ARE PROBLEMS 
Collateral consequences and employment discrimination are ob-
stacles to a returning citizen’s chances of obtaining employment, which 
is widely considered critical to reentry success.51 Not only does failure 
to find employment mean returning citizens will struggle to pay for rent 
and other living expenses, it also means they are at a heightened risk of 
recidivating.52 Thus, a successful reentry hinges on whether a returning 
citizen can obtain a job.53 
As illustrated by Clinton’s story, successfully finding and retain-
ing employment can separate a successful reentry process from an un-
successful one.54 Employment, important for paying the costs of living, 
also “helps ex-prisoners be productive, take care of their families, de-
velop valuable life skills, and strengthen their self-esteem and social 
connectedness.”55 Obstacles to employment are obstacles to productiv-
ity, healthy relationships, and self-esteem.56 Clinton’s job allowed him 
                                                            
46 Stacy A. Hickox & Mark V. Roehling, Negative Credentials: Fair and Effective Considera-
tion of Criminal Records, 50 AMERICAN BUS. L.J. 201, 226 (2013). 
47 Carlin & Frick, supra note 33, at 113. 
48 Hickox & Roehling, supra note 46, at 226 (comparing survey results from the 1970s against 
more recent studies of employer attitudes). 
49 See infra Part II-B. 
50 See infra Part II-B. 
51 Joan Petersilia, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY, 112 (2003). 
52 See infra text accompanying notes 54, 60. 
53 See infra text accompanying notes 54, 60. 
54 See supra Part I. 
55 Petersilia, supra note 51, at 112. 
56 See infra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
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to legally support himself and his family,57 but when he lost it and re-
turned to selling drugs he jeopardized his freedom and damaged his self-
esteem and happiness.58 Even though Clinton did it to support his nieces, 
selling drugs corroded his own his happiness.59 
Scholars agree employment is important for successful reentry 
because unemployment is widely considered to increase the likelihood 
of recidivism.60 Although at least one study argued that employment 
does not significantly decrease the likelihood of recidivism over time,61 
the “general agreement” is that “securing employment is a significant 
factor in whether there is recidivism.”62 John Nally, the Director of Ed-
ucation for Indiana’s Department of Correction, and his colleagues con-
cluded “education and employment were the most important predictors 
of recidivism” and found uneducated (or under-educated) or unem-
ployed returning citizens were more likely to recidivate.63 The study, 
which followed 6,561 subjects for five years, found “employment sta-
tus” was correlated with a 37.4% decrease in recidivism.64 
Despite their job-seeking efforts returning citizens face high un-
employment rates.65 The Prison Policy Initiative calculates that the na-
tional unemployment rate is a staggering 27.3%, in contrast to the gen-
eral public’s unemployment rate of only 5.2%.66 The Prison Policy 
Initiative contends that this unemployment rate is not for lack of trying 
by returning citizens: “formerly incarcerated people want to work, but 
                                                            
57 Braman & Wood, supra note 2, at 171. 
58 Id. at 172–3. 
59 Id. 
60 Mullings, supra note 26, at 267; PETERSILIA, supra note 51, at 112 (stating “[r]esearch has 
empirically established a positive link between job stability and reduced criminal offending”); 
Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination Against 
Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 45, 63 (2015) (stating “[a]lthough the relationship between 
employment and recidivism is complex, studies have consistently found that ex-offenders are 
less likely to recidivate if they are employed”). 
61 See Stephen J. Tripodi et al., Is Employment Associated with Reduced Recidivism?: The 
Complex Relationship Between Employment and Crime, 54 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY 
& COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 706, 714 (2010). The authors of this study did find that em-
ployment does at least prolong the time it takes for a returning citizen to recidivate. Id. at 
715–16. 
62 Mullings, supra note 26, at 267. 
63 John M. Nally, et al., Post-Release Recidivism and Employment Among Different Types of 
Released Offenders: A 5-Year Follow-Up Study in the United States, 9 INT’L J. OF CRIM. JUST. 
SCI. 16, 16, 27 (2014). 
64 Id. at 26–27. 
65 See infra text accompanying note 65. 
66 Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work: Unemployment Among 
Formerly Incarcerated People, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 2018), https://www.prisonpol-
icy.org/reports/outofwork.html. Although published in 2018, the study’s dataset is from 2008. 
Id. 
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face structural barriers to securing employment, particularly within the 
period immediately following release.”67 The Prison Policy Initiative 
reaches this conclusion based on a nationally representative dataset that 
counterintuitively revealed returning citizens have higher unemploy-
ment rates than the general public, despite being more likely to be “ac-
tive” in the labor market.68 Given that being “active” in the labor market 
includes both working and “actively looking for work,” The Prison Pol-
icy Initiative concludes that many returning citizens are “actively look-
ing for work,” but not finding employment, thus creating the high un-
employment rate.69 The Initiative describes this as a “counterproductive 
system of release and poverty,” which harms employers, the taxpayers, 
and returning citizens.70 
C. THE IMPACT OF RECIDIVISM ON INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES, 
COMMUNITIES, AND SOCIETY 
Unemployment makes post-incarceration life difficult for re-
turning citizens and their families,71 particularly when unemployment 
leads to recidivism. Recidivism has significant consequences for indi-
viduals,72 families,73 communities,74 and society.75 These crushing re-
sults emphasize why finding solutions that lead to employment for re-
turning citizens is so important. 
1. RECIDIVATING RE-EXPOSES INDIVIDUALS TO THE TRAUMA OF 
INCARCERATION 
Recidivating means the individual will once again find them-
selves within the crushing grip of incarceration.76 They will re-experi-
ence the trauma and stigma associated with being incarcerated, includ-
ing the array of psychological harms that persist beyond the end of 
incarceration and create problems for the individual when they (again) 
                                                            
67 Id. 
68 Id. “Among 24-44 year old” returning citizens “93.3% are either employed or actively 
looking for work, compared to 83.8% among their general population peers of similar ages.” 
Id. 
69 See Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See supra Part II-B. 
72 See infra Part II-C(1). 
73 See infra Part II-C(2). 
74 See infra Part II-C(3). 
75 See infra Part II-C(4). 
76 See infra Part II-C(1). 
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attempt to reintegrate.77 These harms can range from developing hyper-
vigilant and suspicious tendencies,78 to a diminished sense of self-worth 
and personal value,79 to post-traumatic stress reactions.80 Recidivating 
re-exposes individuals to the mental health and self-image deprivations 
experienced while in prison.81 
When an individual recidivates, they are also likely to face a 
harsher punishment because of their prior criminal record.82 Sentencing 
regimes consider criminal history, as evidenced by the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines’ use of a criminal history score when calculating a sen-
tence.83 The federal regime converts prior convictions into points based 
on the severity and age of the prior conviction, among other factors, and 
adds them together to obtain a criminal history score, which is used in 
the calculation of a sentence.84 Thus, recidivating leads to lengthier 
terms of incarceration, prolonging the time an individual is subjected to 
the traumas of incarceration.85 
2. RECIDIVISM DENIES FAMILIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND 
DAMAGES RELATIONSHIPS 
Recidivism challenges family finances and damages familial re-
lationships.86 Losing a family member to prison means the family po-
tentially loses a breadwinner, which can jeopardize finances and 
threaten food security.87 Furthermore, “incarceration has a powerfully 
corrosive effect on family structure.”88 This “corrosive effect” is seen in 
the relationships of romantic partners, as well as in the relationships be-
tween parents and children; married men’s chances of divorce increase 
when they are incarcerated,89 while children experience a “variety of 
                                                            
77 See Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison 
Adjustment, Paper prepared for the “From Prison to Home” Conference 77 (Jan. 30–31, 2002), 
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410624_PyschologicalImpact.pdf (discussing the 
psychological impact incarceration has and how that affects reentry). 
78 Id. at 81. 
79 Id. at 83. 
80 Id. 
81 See supra text accompanying notes 78–80. 
82 See infra text accompanying 83–84. 
83 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
84 See Id. 
85 See supra text accompanying notes 77–84. 
86 Flake, supra note 60, at 65. 
87 See id.; See also Braman & Wood, supra note 2 at 169–70. 
88 Braman & Wood, supra note 2, at 170. 
89 See id.; See also Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce Western, Incarceration and the Formation and 
Stability of Marital Unions, 67 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 721, 731 (2005) (stating “[t]he average 
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negative long-term effects . . . .”90 These “long-term effects” include 
damage to the parent-child bond, as well as problems with academic 
success and in-school behavior.91 For families whose loved ones are 
caught in a cycle of reentry, re-arrest, and reincarceration, the process 
“can have devastating effects on family life and . . . child develop-
ment.”92 
3. COMMUNITIES WHITHER IN THE FACE OF THEIR MEMBERS’ RE-
INCARCERATION 
Incarceration also damages the vitality of communities.93 The 
“phenomenon” of reentry affects whole communities because “most in-
carcerated people come from and return to a small set of inner-city 
neighborhoods,” which means that incarceration’s effects are heavily 
concentrated in those communities.94 This “fundamentally [undermines] 
community cohesion”95 or generates a communal sense of stigma or low 
self-esteem.96 As a result, community members withdraw from commu-
nity life, depriving community institutions, such as local businesses and 
churches, of the people they need to remain open and successful.97 In-
carceration also leads to residential turnover in communities as residents 
move around, further damaging communal bonds and isolating resi-
dents.98 Recidivism perpetuates communities’ exposure to these impacts 
beyond a community member’s first incarceration.99 
 
                                                            
annual hazard rate for divorce is 4% among men who have not been incarcerated; incarceration 
is estimated to raise this risk to 13%.”). 
90 Flake, supra note 60, at 65. 
91  See id. at 65–66; See also Ross D. Parke & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, The Effects of Parental 
Incarceration on Children: Perspectives, Promises, and Policies, in PRISONERS ONCE 
REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND 
COMMUNITIES, 189, 202–04 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003). 
92 Braman & Wood, supra note 2, at 158. 
93 See infra text accompanying notes 94–99. 
94 Eric Cadora et al., Criminal Justice and Health and Human Services: An Exploration of 
Overlapping Needs, Resources, and Interests in Brooklyn Neighborhoods, in PRISONERS ONCE 
REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND 
COMMUNITIES 285, 285 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003). 
95 Flake, supra note 60, at 66. 
96 Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Reentry, and Social Capital: Social Networks 
in the Balance, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 
ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 313, 314 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 
2003). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 316. 
99 See supra text accompanying notes 93–98. 
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4. SOCIETY 
 
The costs of returning citizen unemployment and recidivism are 
not just confined to their families and communities.100 The high cost of 
incarceration means that each time an individual recidivates there is a 
price to be paid by society.101 In 2016, incarceration cost the United 
States approximately $1 trillion.102 The Vera Institute of Justice reports 
that the “average cost per inmate” varied wildly by state in 2015.103 Of 
the 45 states that provided data, Alabama spent the least per inmate, 
$14,780.00, while New York spent the most, $69,355.00.104 The average 
amount spent was $33,274.00.105 Increasing employment for returning 
citizens would save money: 
 
A study conducted in Philadelphia concluded that em-
ploying just 100 more formerly incarcerated individuals 
would lead to a $2 million reduction in the city’s correc-
tional costs. A Florida study estimated that increasing 
employment for individuals released from state prisons 
by 50 percent would save the state $86 million annually 
in costs associated with future recidivism. Similarly, 
Pew Research Center has suggested that if states could 
lower recidivism rates by just 10 percent, they could save 
an average of $635 million annually.106 
 
The destructive impacts of returning citizen unemployment and 
recidivism on individuals, families, and communities is reason enough 
                                                            
100 See infra text accompanying notes 102–07. 
101 See infra text accompanying notes 102–07. 
102 Neil Schoenherr, Cost of Incarceration in the U.S. More Than $1 Trillion, WASHINGTON 
UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS THE SOURCE (Sept. 7, 2016), https://source.wustl.edu/2016/09/cost-incar-
ceration-u-s-1-trillion/. “Federal and state governments spend $80 billion annually to operate 
prisons and jails.” Michael McLaughlin, et al., The Economic Burden of Incarceration in the 
U.S. 6 (Concordance Inst. For Advancing Social Just., Working Paper No. CI072016, 2016). 
The Concordance Institute’s study attempts to calculate the aggregate societal cost of incar-
ceration by calculating the costs to demographic groups such as families, children, and com-
munities—groups “innocent of any wrongdoing.” The study estimates those costs, along with 
the direct costs of incarceration, total $997 million. Id. at 18. 
103 Prison Spending in 2015, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org/publications/price-
of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-
prisons-2015-state-spending-trends-prison-spending (last visited Nov. 14, 2018). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Back to Business: How Hiring Formerly Incarcerated Job Seekers Benefited Your Com-
pany, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_docu-
ment/060917-trone-reportweb_0.pdf. 
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to act to mitigate the harms of collateral consequences and employment 
discrimination,107 but the aggregated cost to society is yet another reason 
to act.108 
III. THE EXISTING EFFORTS TO REMOVE OBSTACLES TO EMPLOYMENT 
DO NOT DO ENOUGH 
There are a variety of remedies intended to remove the obstacles 
preventing returning citizens from obtaining employment.109 Unfortu-
nately, those measures fail returning citizens because they leave them 
exposed to employment discrimination or require them to engage in 
lengthy and expensive litigation.110 This section looks at statutory re-
form efforts, expungement statutes, Ban the Box provisions, the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 
the ways they fail returning citizens.111 
A. STATUTORY REFORM LEAVES RETURNING CITIZENS EXPOSED 
TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
As previously discussed, many collateral consequences are stat-
utes that create penalties, restrictions, and disabilities for returning citi-
zens.112 They are scattered throughout federal and state codes113 and 
number in the tens of thousands.114 Reforming these laws may still leave 
returning citizens exposed to employer discrimination, but their removal 
would mean that returning citizens could start their own businesses or 
find work with willing employers.115 While statutory reform alone can-
not remedy all obstacles, if combined with a program like what this 
comment proposes, statutory reforms offer great promise.116 
Fortunately, federal and state governments have taken steps to 
address statutory collateral consequences.117 Congress ordered the crea-
                                                            
107 See supra Part II-C(1)–(3). 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 100–07. 
109 See infra Part III-A–D. 
110 See infra Part III-A–D. 
111 See infra Part III-A–D. 
112 See supra Part II-A. 
113 See supra Part II-A. 
114 Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 39. 
115 See infra Part IV. 
116 See infra Part IV. 
117 See infra text accompanying notes 118–25. 
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tion of The National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Con-
viction118 to “collect and analyze the collateral consequences in place in 
each U.S. jurisdiction.”119 Meanwhile, the Obama Administration ar-
gued for re-evaluating occupational licensing requirements because of 
the disproportionate impact licensing restrictions can have on returning 
citizens, such as denying licenses due to any kind of criminal convic-
tion, irrespective of a connection between the conviction and the li-
cense.120 Finally, many states, including Delaware,121 Indiana,122 Ne-
braska,123 and Maryland,124 have reduced the ways in which criminal 
convictions can prevent returning citizens from obtaining occupational 
licenses.125 
B. BAN THE BOX APPLIES TOO NARROWLY AND POTENTIALLY 
INCREASES RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
Ban the Box is a movement seeking to ban employers from ask-
ing about prior convictions by “removing the conviction history check-
                                                            
118  Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 39; Court Security Improvement Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177 § 510(a), 121 Stat. 2534, 2544 (2008). 
119  Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 39. 
120 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, AND 
THE DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (July 
2015). 
121 Licensing boards can no longer consider convictions older than 10 years and returning 
citizens may apply for a waiver of a prior felony conviction after only three years, as opposed 
to five. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 24, § 5107 (West 2018). 
122 “Good character” and “moral turpitude” clauses were removed from licensing board require-
ments; licensing boards must limit disqualifying crimes to those “specifically and directly” re-
lated to the profession in which the applicant is seeking a license. 2018 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 
182-2018 (H.E.A. 1245) (West). 
123 Occupational licensing boards must render decisions as to whether a criminal conviction 
disqualifies an applicant within ninety days of receiving a preliminary application. NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 84-947(4) (West 2019). 
124 The Departments of Agriculture, Environment, Health, Human Services, Public Safety and 
Correctional Services, and Labor, Licensing, and Regulation cannot deny an occupational li-
cense or certificate application solely because of a prior, non-crime of violence, conviction un-
less the department determines there is a direct relationship between the prior conviction and 
the specific occupational license or certificate, or if issuing the license or certificate would “in-
volve an unreasonable risk to property … safety . . . or welfare … “ MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC., § 1-209(a),(d) (West 2019). 
125 Adam Edelman, Inmates Who Learn Trades are Often Blocked from Jobs. Now Something’s 
Being Done, NBC NEWS (May 26, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/in-
mates-who-learn-trades-are-often-blocked-jobs-now-something-n877666. 
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box from a job application.”126 Some versions of these “fair-chance hir-
ing laws” require employers to wait longer in the application process 
before conducting criminal background checks.127 The campaign to 
“ban the box” has become a popular one, with 35 states and 150 cities 
and counties adopting Ban the Box or fair-chance measures.128 An esti-
mated 258 million people in the United States live in a jurisdiction with 
a ban-the-box or fair-chance policy.129 The Obama Administration put 
their weight behind the initiative, directing the Office of Personnel Man-
agement to modify rules, where they could, to delay inquiring into crim-
inal history until later than the beginning of the hiring process.130 
Despite Ban the Box’s laudable goals, the initiative is problem-
atic because it is narrow in scope and may lead to increased racial dis-
crimination.131 First, Ban the Box statutes frequently only apply to pub-
lic, not private, employers.132 Although some jurisdictions have taken 
efforts to expand Ban the Box policies to private employers, as of July 
1, 2019, only 13 states and 18 cities and counties had done so.133 More 
seriously, Ban the Box may lead to discrimination against applicants of 
color.134 One recent study concluded that “BTB [Ban the Box] does ap-
pear to increase racial discrimination.”135 That study showed before Ban 
the Box, white applicants received 7% more callbacks than similar black 
applicants, but that after Ban the Box laws were instituted the gap be-
tween white and black applicants grew to 43%.136 Not only did white 
applicants see gains in their callback percentage, but black applicants 
saw a drop.137 Furthermore, black applicants without a criminal record 
saw a substantial drop in callback rates after the adoption of Ban the 
                                                            
126 Michelle Natividad Rodriguez, “Ban the Box” is a Fair Chance for Workers with Rec-
ords, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT (Aug. 2017), https://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-box-fair-
chance-workers-records/. 
127 Beth Avery, Ban The Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies, 
NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT (July 1, 2019), https://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-
fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide/. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Fact Sheet: President Obama Announced New Actions to Promote Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration for the Formerly-Incarcerated, THE WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF THE PRESS 
SECRETARY (Nov. 2, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2015/11/02/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new-actions-promote-rehabilitation. 
131 See infra text accompanying notes 132–38. 
132 Mullings, supra note 26, at 282. 
133 Avery, supra note 127. 
134 See infra text accompanying notes 135–39. 
135 Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: 
A Field Experiment, 133 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 191, 195 (2018). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
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Box laws.138 Although Ban the Box’s intentions are sound, it is not a 
viable solution if it exacerbates racial discrimination in hiring. This is 
especially true when people of color are disproportionately incarcer-
ated.139 
C. EXPUNGEMENT STATUTES AND THE FCRA CANNOT PROTECT 
RETURNING CITIZENS FROM THE INTERNET OR ERRONEOUS 
REPORTING OF EXPUNGED RECORDS 
Expungement statutes and the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA) have been grouped together because of the similarities in how 
they operate and how they inadequately serve the needs of returning cit-
izens.140 Both statutes seek to regulate employer access to applicants’ 
criminal records.141 Expungements do this by removing records and re-
lated documents of a criminal conviction from public accessibility.142 
The FCRA regulates the “collection and dissemination of consumer re-
ports” that are produced by Consumer Reporting Agencies (CRAs).143 
Employers that wish to use consumer reports, and the criminal convic-
tion information they contain, as a background check must follow a se-
ries of steps, which include obtaining authorization of the applicant to 
conduct the background check, notifying the applicant of their rights 
under the FCRA before taking adverse action against the applicant, and 
providing the applicant with further information about their rights under 
the FCRA if the employer is going to take adverse action.144 
Unfortunately, the efficacy of expungements and the FCRA is 
limited by the internet and mistakes made by CRAs.145 First, expunge-
ment statutes and the FCRA only apply to official criminal records.146 
This is problematic because criminal record information can proliferate 
                                                            
138 Id. 
139 See Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED 
PEOPLE https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
140 See infra text accompanying notes 142–60. 
141 See infra text accompanying notes 142–44. 
142 Lahny Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent Fed-
eral Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 159 (2011). 
143 Carlin & Frick, supra note 33, at 121. 
144 Id. at 123–5. 
145 See infra text accompanying notes 146–60. 
146 Elizabeth Westrope, Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Criminal History: Why an 
Anti-Discrimination Statute is a Necessary Remedy, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367, 380 
(2018). 
ELLIOTT  
354 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 19:2 
across the internet far beyond official databases,147 at which point em-
ployers can locate and use the information to discriminate.148 Such in-
formation is available via online news reports149 and commercial mug-
shot databases, which may charge returning citizens hundreds of dollars 
to remove their mugshot from the database.150 Furthermore, consumer 
reports provide criminal conviction information to employers because 
the FCRA permits criminal convictions to remain on reports,151 and be-
cause CRAs mistakenly include arrest records and expunged convic-
tions.152 CRAs operate by obtaining criminal records from official data-
bases, digitizing the records, and then making them available in 
background checks.153 If a conviction is expunged after a CRA adds it 
to their database, and the CRA does not remove the conviction, then the 
record may be improperly disclosed.154 This was the allegation of a 2010 
class action lawsuit brought against LexisNexis, which resulted in a 
2015 settlement paying $1,000.00 each to 300 Pennsylvanians who re-
ceived inaccurate background checks.155 It is unclear how frequently 
CRAs make such mistakes, but the issue has been recognized by attor-
neys, scholars, and policy analysts,156 as well as at least three other class 
                                                            
147 Id. at 373. 
148 See id. at 374–75. 
149 Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with the First 
Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 
19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123, 136 (2010). It is easy to find old news stories via a newspa-
per’s website, simple Google searches, or through databases such as LexisNexis Academic. 
Id. 
150 Westrope, supra note 146, at 374 (citing Peter Lowe, Applicants’ Mug Shots May be Just 
a Click Away, 19 NO. 4 ME. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2013)). 
151 Carlin & Frick, supra note 33, at 135; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c(a)(5) (2006). 
152 Carlin & Frick, supra note 33, at 135–36. 
153 Id. at 121–22; Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 17, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us/17expunge.html. 
154 Liptak, supra note 153. 
155 Sharon M. Dietrich, Preventing Background Screeners from Reporting Expunged Crimi-
nal Cases, CLEARINGHOUSE COMMUNITY (Apr. 2015), http://povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/sto-
ries/dietrich. Dietrich notes that the $1,000.00 payout, while one of the largest ever for a Fair 
Credit Reporting Act class action, does not replace the lost wages of class members. Id. 
156 Despite the apparent lack of available statistics on how frequently mistakes are made by 
CRAs, there does seem to be a consensus such mistakes are being made. See Liptak, supra note 
153; Sarah Esther Lageson, Policy Proposal: Enforce Private Sector Compliance with Criminal 
Record Expungement Orders, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Nov. 13, 2018), https://schol-
ars.org/brief/policy-proposal-enforce-private-sector-compliance-criminal-record-expunge-
ment-orders; Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. 
L. REV. 321, 345 (2015); Best Practice Standards: The Proper Use of Criminal Records in Hir-
ing, LAW. COMM. FOR C.R. UNDER L., 14–15 (2013), available at https://hirenet-
work.org/sites/default/files/Best-Practices-Standards-The-Proper-Use-of-Criminal-Records-in-
Hiring.pdf. 
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action lawsuits similar to the LexisNexis suit.157  The usefulness of ex-
pungements and the FCRA is limited by the breadth of information 
available on the internet and the mistakes of CRAs.158 Furthermore, as 
the LexisNexis case shows, lawsuits are lengthy endeavors that can dis-
tract returning citizens from obtaining employment.159 Solutions not 
contingent on returning citizens keeping their criminal records indefi-
nitely hidden from employers are needed.160 
D. TITLE VII CLAIMS CAN ONLY BE USED BY SOME RETURNING 
CITIZENS, IN ADDITION TO BEING “VIRTUALLY” IMPOSSIBLE TO 
WIN AND TIME CONSUMING 
Under a Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claim, return-
ing citizens may bring lawsuits alleging an employer discriminated 
against them because of a protected characteristic they possess—such 
as race, gender, or national origin.161 Claims typically take one of two 
forms:162 disparate treatment, in which the plaintiff alleges intentional 
discrimination,163 and disparate impact, in which the plaintiff alleges 
that a facially neutral policy has a discriminatory impact.164 
To succeed under a disparate treatment claim the plaintiff has to 
show either “discriminatory animus” or, by inference, “that the em-
ployer’s decision was based on a prohibited characteristic.”165 Such an 
inference is proven by showing that the plaintiff “was treated differently 
than similarly-situated persons outside of his protected class.”166 The 
comparison between plaintiffs and the “similarly-situated persons” 
needs to be drawn very closely, which has made disparate treatment 
claims difficult to prove.167 
On the other hand, disparate impact claims require parties to pro-
gress through three stages of litigation.168 First, the plaintiff makes a 
                                                            
157 Dietrich, supra note 155. The cases Dietrich identifies are Henderson v. HireRight Solutions 
Inc., Roe v. Intellicorp Records Inc., and Robinson v. General Information Services, Inc. Id. 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 145–57. 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 155–57 
160 See infra Part IV. 
161 Mullings, supra note 26, at 276. 
162 Id. at 277. 
163 Id. 
164 Tammy R. Pettinato, Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders: The Promise 
and Limits of Title VII Disparate Impact Theory, 98 MARQ. L.R. 831, 840 (2014). 
165 Mullings, supra note 26, at 277. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 278. 
168 Pettinato, supra note 164, at 840. 
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prima facie case showing the employer used a facially neutral policy 
that had a racially discriminatory effect.169 The theory is that because 
people of color are disproportionately incarcerated, a policy discrimi-
nating against returning citizens disproportionately impacts people of 
color, particularly black and Hispanic men.170 If the plaintiff is able to 
show this then the employer must show a business necessity for the pol-
icy.171 Finally, the plaintiff will have to rebut the business necessity de-
fense by showing that “another, less discriminatory policy is available 
that would equally fulfill the business necessity.”172 
Title VII claims are problematic because not everyone can use 
them, in addition to being difficult to win and time consuming.173 Plain-
tiffs must be part of a disproportionately incarcerated racial group, 
which means not all returning citizens can utilize Title VII claims.174 
Even if a claim can be brought, the suits are nearly impossible to win: 
plaintiffs have lost “almost every case” since the 1980s.175 Alexandra 
Harwin, a Title VII discrimination attorney and partner of Sanford 
Heisler Sharp, LLP, conducted a study which found only three cases in 
which returning citizen plaintiffs survived a motion for summary judg-
ment, and no cases in which a returning citizen won after a trial on its 
merits.176 Similarly, a study of all employment discrimination claims be-
tween 1979 and 2006 found that the plaintiffs’ win rate was only 15%.177 
Another study found that only 1% of federal job discrimination, haras-
sment, and retaliation claims succeed in court.178 Although those statis-
tics are not specific to just returning citizen claims, they do reflect the 
“tough row to hoe”179 facing them. Furthermore, even if there was a re-
alistic chance of success, a Title VII claim means returning citizens are 
                                                            
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Pettinato, supra note 164, at 842–43; Mullings, supra note 26, at 276–77. 
174 Pettinato, supra note 164, at 840; Mullings, supra note 26, at 281. 
175 Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against Minority 
Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 12–13; Westrope, supra 
note 146, at 383. 
176 Id. at 12 n.59; Alexandra Harwin, SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP, https://sanfordheis-
ler.com/team/alexandra-harwin/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
177 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal 
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 127 (2009). 
178 Sean Captain, Workers Win Only 1% of Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits at Trial, FAST CO. 
(July 31, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40440310/employees-win-very-few-civil-
rights-lawsuits. 
179 Clermont & Stewart, supra note 177, at 103. 
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expending some amount of time and resources necessary to bring a law-
suit. 
IV. SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS PROVIDE SOLUTIONS 
TO EMPLOYMENT OBSTACLES THAT BENEFIT RETURNING CITIZENS, 
FAMILIES, COMMUNITIES, AND SOCIETY 
This comment advocates investing resources into the creation of 
small business development programs (SBD programs) to help return-
ing citizens develop their own business or obtain employment with a 
business created through the SBD programs, bypassing the pitfalls of 
the measures discussed in Part III.180 Unlike statutory reform, Ban the 
Box, expungement statutes, and the FCRA, SBD programs would not 
expose returning citizens to employment discrimination.181 SBD pro-
grams would also not require returning citizens to expend energy bring-
ing lawsuits under the FCRA or Title VII.182 SBD programs would ac-
complish this by providing returning citizens a direct route to 
employment, meaning they would not need to apply for jobs with a po-
tentially discriminatory employer or need to bring lawsuits.183 
SBD programs would decrease recidivism and increase the like-
lihood of successful reentry by providing access to employment, educa-
tion, and a network of people successfully navigating reentry.184 This 
proposal is inspired by existing organizations and programs, as well as 
recidivism research.185 Two of those organizations are 501(c)3 non-pro-
fits that provide returning citizens with entrepreneurial training and as-
sist with obtaining capital: Rising Tide Capital186 and Defy Ventures.187 
                                                            
180 See infra Part IV-A(i). 
181 See infra Part IV-B. 
182 See infra Part IV-B. 
183 See infra Part IV-B. 
184 See infra Part IV-B. 
185 See infra text accompanying notes 144–48; See infra Part IV-B. 
186 Rising Tide Capital focuses its efforts not just on returning citizens, but on underserved 
urban neighborhoods. Our Mission, RISING TIDE CAPITAL, https://www.risingtidecapi-
tal.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). The program consists of a twelve-week business 
academy, subsequent learning and coaching, and assistance obtaining capital. Rising Tide Cap-
ital Annual Report 2017-2018, RISING TIDE CAPITAL, 8, https://www.risingtidecapital.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/2017-18-Annual-Report_Optimized.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
Rising Tide Capital asserts they have 2,174 graduates, that 80% of businesses survive beyond 
the five years, and that within two years businesses see an 112% increase in average business 
sales and a 58% increase in average household income. Id. at 10–11. 
187 Defy Ventures provides education and entrepreneurship training for “Entrepreneurs-in-
Training” while they are still incarcerated. Defy Program, DEFY VENTURES, https://www.de-
fyventures.org/our-story-main/our-programs (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). Defy relies in part on 
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Other 501(c)3 non-profits, such as Mercy Corps Northwest188 and the 
Prison Entrepreneurship Program189 provide training and reentry sup-
port services.190 
There are also state-run programs attempting to cultivate return-
ing citizen entrepreneurship.191 Oklahoma’s Entrepreneurial Ex-Offend-
ers Training and Support Program is an entrepreneurship-focused edu-
cational program for those still incarcerated.192 Maryland and Alabama 
both passed legislation requiring the establishment of pilot programs 
that provide training and funding to returning citizens for small business 
development, but those pilot programs expire at the end of 2020 and the 
                                                            
volunteers who vet the business proposals of “Entrepreneurs-in-Training” and select top pro-
posals who will received $500.00 from Defy and the opportunity to meet with potential inves-
tors. David Straus, Defying the Odd: Prison Inmates are Taught How to Be the CEO of Their 
Own Lives INC (July 25, 2018), https://www.inc.com/david-straus/this-venture-company-of-se-
cond-chances-earns-its-own-second-chance.html. Defy boasts that there are 143 graduate 
owned, incorporated businesses, and that at least 768 participants enrolled in and completed at 
least one of their post-release assignments. Andrew Glazier, A Year In Review: A Letter from 
Defy’s President and CEO, DEFY VENTURES, https://www.defyventures.org/static/up-
loads/files/annual-report-2019-final-19-02-01-wfrqbkdwbgng.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
188 Mercy Corps Northwest’s Lifelong Information for Entrepreneurs (LIFE) program provides 
a 32-week training program with the goal of “develop[ing] an entrepreneurial mindset and lev-
erage[ing] the potential of self-employment [to] promote resilience, and economic stability.” 
Lifelong Information for Entrepreneurs (LIFE), MERCY CORPS NORTHWEST, https://www.mer-
cycorpsnw.org/reentry-transition-center/life/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). LIFE currently serves 
Oregon’s only women’s prison, but it hopes to expand to men’s prisons, in addition to providing 
further post-release services. Id 
189 Prison Entrepreneurship Program (PEP) annually selects 500 men from over 10,000 candi-
dates for their in-prison education and leadership academy, in which the men will develop their 
own business plan as part of a competition. Empowering Innovation, PRISON ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
PROGRAM, https://www.pep.org/empowering-nnovation/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). Follow-
ing their release, program members are picked up from the prison’s gates by PEP workers and 
have the option of living in one of five transition homes managed by PEP. Releasing Potential, 
PRISON ENTREPRENEURSHIP PROGRAM, https://www.pep.org/releasing-potential/ (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2019). PEP graduates have access to an “eSchool” educational program, business cen-
ters, and help obtaining loans. Transforming Communities, PRISON ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
PROGRAM, https://www.pep.org/transforming-communities/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
190 There is another non-profit organization that deserves recognition: Change the Hustle. 
Learning about the Philadelphia based organization was the author’s initial catalyst for this com-
ment. The organization sought to direct people from illicit enterprises towards “legal opportu-
nities with high income potential and lower personal risk” by teaching participants business 
planning investor cultivation, and by assigning a mentor. Unfortunately, as of September 14, 
2019, the organization, or at least its website, appears defunct: the domain name is available for 
purchase. The website address is provided here in case the website is restored. CHANGE THE 
HUSTLE, http://changethehustle.com/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
191 See infra text accompanying notes 192–95. 
192 Program Intent, ST. OF OKLA., https://www.ok.gov/eeots/Program_Intent/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
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Maryland program at least has already been abrogated.193 The District 
of Columbia Council passed legislation paving the way for the creation 
of the Incarceration to Incorporation Entrepreneurship Program in 2016, 
which would provide returning citizens access to training, mentorship, 
and capital.194 Unfortunately, the program was not funded in either of 
Mayor Muriel E. Bowser’s two budgets since its passage and, while  
facing automatic repeal not funded in the 2020 budget, was repealed in 
2019.195 Finally, there are efforts to create a similar federal program via 
H.R. 5078, the Prison to Proprietorship Act, and H.R. 5065, the Prison 
to Proprietorship for Formerly Incarcerated Act.196 Both H.R. 5078 and 
5065 have passed the House of Representatives and have been referred 
to the Senate’s Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship.197 
Both acts focus on educational efforts.198 
The SBD programs proposed by this comment recognize that 
education and employment are important to reducing recidivism199 by 
planning to teach returning citizens the skills needed to run a small busi-
ness and to assist them in finding employment. The proposed SBD pro-
grams would additionally seek to “address the three main causal mech-
anisms linking imprisonment to unemployment: social stigma of 
incarceration, damage to human capital (i.e., job skills), and the erosion 
of social capital (i.e., personal connections and job networks).”200 Busi-
nesses developed with the help of SBD programs would address these 
mechanisms by showing that returning citizens can create and retain 
jobs, helping them cultivate the skills needed to be successful workers, 
                                                            
193 MD. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT CODE ANN. § 11-1201 abrogated; ALA. Code § 41-29-320 
(2015). The text of both statutes is remarkably similar in structure, word choice, and pilot pro-
gram timeframe. Id. 
194 63 D.C. Reg. 10771 (Aug. 18, 2016); see also D.C. CODE § 2-1210.51-.55 (2016) (repealed 
2019). 
195 Kevin Smith, More Broken Promises on Returning Citizens, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/more-broken-promises-on-returning-citi-
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196 Derek T. Dingle, New Legislation Seeks to Help Formerly Incarcerated Launch Business, 
BLACK ENTERPRISE (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.blackenterprise.com/prison-help-formerly-in-
carcerated-launch-businesses/. 
197 Prison to Proprietorship Act of 2019, H.R. 5078, 116th Cong. (2019); Prison to Proprietor-
ship for Formerly Incarcerated Act of 2019, H.R. 5065, 116th Cong. (2019). 
198 Id. 
199 Nally, et al., supra note 63, at 27 (stating “this study’s results revealed that the offender’s 
education and employment were the most important predictors of recidivism. Specifically, ex-
offenders were more likely to be re-incarcerated if they were uneducated (or under-educated) or 
unemployed.”). 
200 Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice: Prisoner Reentry as an Opportunity to 
Confront and Counteract Racism, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 259, 291 (2009). 
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and providing a network between returning citizens and businesses.201 
SBD programs would meet these needs by employing and educating re-
turning citizens in small businesses where they will work alongside peo-
ple that understand reentry’s challenges.202 
This section begins in Part IV-A by outlining a framework for 
how SBD programs could be structured,203 before discussing benefits of 
SBD programs for individuals, families, and communities in Part IV-
B.204 Part IV-C concludes by discussing how costs and perpetuation of 
stigma are potential drawbacks of SBD programs.205 
A. A POTENTIAL FRAMEWORK FOR HOW SBD PROGRAMS WOULD 
HELP RETURNING CITIZENS 
This outline of a potential framework for SBD programs incor-
porates the educational and financial support elements of programs dis-
cussed above.206 The hypothetical SBD program framework suggested 
here is more ambitious than some of those existing programs in that it 
seeks to work with returning citizens from pre-release through estab-
lishment and growth of their small business (or through placement with 
a business that matches their skillset).207 The goal is to support returning 
citizens from the initial planning stages all the way through overcoming 
the initial financial obstacles to small business development.208 
1. Phase One: Help Returning Citizens Develop a “Personal 
Business Plan” 
The hypothetical SBD programs this comment envisions will 
first help returning citizens develop a “personal business plan” for their 
new lives, while still incarcerated.209 This will consist of three steps that 
focus on education and planning, like the entrepreneurship programs 
discussed above.210 After identifying candidates likely to succeed in a 
small business development program, the hypothetical SBD programs 
                                                            
201 See infra Part IV-B. 
202 See infra Part IV-B. 
203 See infra Part IV-A. 
204 See infra Part IV-B. 
205 See infra Part IV-C. 
206 See infra Part IV-A(1), (2), (3). 
207 See infra Part IV-A(1), (2), (3). 
208 See infra Part IV-A(1), (2), (3). 
209 See infra Part IV-A(1). 
210 Programs such as Defy, PEP, LIFE, and Rising Tide Capital have all begun their work pre-
release, and seemingly had success with this approach. See infra Part IV. 
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would work with individuals to envision ways their skills may translate 
to legal entrepreneurial enterprises. Second, the hypothesized SBD pro-
grams will help individuals develop tangible business plans that lend 
themselves to the individual’s skills and strengths. Alternatively, for in-
dividuals who do not want to start a business, the SBD programs would 
place the individual with businesses already established through the 
SBD programs that need their skillset(s). Finally, an SBD program 
would educate and train individuals in the entrepreneurial skills they 
will need to succeed and thrive as small business owners. For example, 
in the case of the non-author Wes Moore, who honed carpentry skills as 
part of his Job Corps training,211 a theoretical SBD program, as proposed 
here, could have assisted him in either developing a comprehensive plan 
for a carpentry or construction business, or it would have identified an 
existing business that Wes Moore could have been placed with.212 Ide-
ally, this would have meant Moore had a consistent job paying a livable 
wage.213 
2. Phase Two: Work with Individuals and Legislatures to 
Overcome Statutory and Occupational Licensing Obstacles 
Returning citizens with entrepreneurial aspirations often face 
statutory and occupational licensing obstacles.214 Under this proposed 
framework, the hypothesized SBD programs will help returning citizens 
overcome these obstacles by being required to lobby legislatures for re-
form and advocate before licensing boards. Working closely with the 
returning citizens, SBD programs will be able to identify and target the 
specific statutory and licensing provisions obstructing members of the 
SBD programs from starting businesses.215 
                                                            
211 MOORE, supra note 2, at 142–43. 
212 See infra Part IV-A(2), (3). 
213 The SBD programs this comment proposes would require the businesses they help establish 
to pay living wages; the SBD programs would provide financial support in the early days of the 
business’ existences to make this a reality. See infra Part IV-A(iii). 
214 See infra Part III-A. 
215 The author has not found examples of small business development organizations advocating 
on behalf of returning citizens as proposed here. There are organizations lobbying legislatures 
for reform, and individual returning citizens have had success challenging licensing boards on 
an individual basis with the help of lawyers. Ashley Nerbovig, License to Clip: A Movement to 
Let the Formerly Incarcerate Cut Hair and Drive Taxis is Gaining Ground, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (July 10, 2018) https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/07/10/license-to-clip. Rather 
than requiring SBD program members to individually obtain a lawyer and challenge a licensing 
board, this proposal seeks to streamline the process by unifying licensing advocacy and business 
planning in the same organization. Id. 
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These advocacy efforts may not require lengthy lobbying work 
to modify statutes.216 In a jurisdiction like Kentucky, an occupational 
licensing applicant has the right to a hearing if their application is denied 
solely because of their prior conviction of a crime.217 Where the juris-
diction permits evidence or testimony as to why an applicant should re-
ceive a license, the SBD program would advocate before the licensing 
board and explain why the prospective entrepreneur should receive a 
license, despite their criminal record.218 
The story of Mike Grennan provides an example of how this 
would work.219 Grennan is a returning citizen who “piec[ed] together 
small construction gigs” following his release.220 Grennan wants to be-
come a home-building contractor, but that requires an occupational li-
cense, something his state, Michigan, denies returning citizens.221 An 
SBD program, as outlined here, would help Grennan develop a business 
plan and then overcome the statutory barriers by either lobbying a for 
statutory change or by advocating that Grennan receive an exemption 
from the state’s licensing agency or board.222 
3. Phase Three: Provide Initial Financial Support to Businesses 
Once the business plan is created and statutory barriers are over-
come, capital will be needed to fund the business.223 The SBD programs 
proposed by this comment would not just help prospective entrepre-
neurs develop the skills to cultivate investment, but they would also pro-
vide financial assistance to subsidize businesses’ operation costs and the 
salaries of employees to a degree that would ensure employees received 
a living wage.224 Furthermore, business developed with the support of 
the proposed SBD programs would be required to pay living wages to 
                                                            
216 See infra text accompanying notes 218. 
217 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335B.030(1)(a)(2) (West 2017). 
218 See infra text accompanying notes 220–22. 
219 See infra text accompanying notes 220–22. 
220 Edelman, supra note 125. 
221 Id. 
222 The author has not found examples of small business development organizations advocating 
on behalf of returning citizens as proposed here. There are organizations lobbying legislatures 
for reform, and individual returning citizens have had success challenging licensing boards on 
an individual basis with the help of lawyers. Nerbovig, supra note 215. 
223 See infra text accompanying notes 227–31. 
224 See infra text accompanying notes 226–36. 
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their employees. This would ensure the business could financially sur-
vive its infancy, in addition to paying its employees a legitimate and 
living wage.225 
Financial assistance, potentially extensive, would need to be 
provided from state funds or private donors.226 Existing and proposed 
programs have recognized the importance of providing financial sup-
port, either through direct financial support or through assistance ob-
taining loans.227 The estimated cost of starting a small business ranges 
from a few thousand dollars228 to tens of thousands of dollars,229 and 
employee wages alone can quickly amount to tens of thousands of dol-
lars.230 Thus, financial support for the fledgling businesses will be criti-
cal. 
Federal law permits lenders to consider a small business loan 
applicant’s criminal history when evaluating creditworthiness, 231  mean-
ing it potentially permits discrimination based on criminal history. 
Given this reality, this comment argues that theoretical SBD programs 
should provide financial assistance to aspiring entrepreneurs to counter-
act the potential difficultly they will have in obtaining business funding. 
This comment envisions that such subsidization would not be indefinite 
but would decrease over time as the business became financially inde-
pendent. 
                                                            
225 As the story of the non-author Wes Moore showed, legal employment that does not pay 
enough is not enough. See supra Part I. 
226 See infra text accompanying notes 227–30. In an ideal world, the financial assistance would 
not be in the form of loans, because even loans at favorable interest rates represent future finan-
cial burden for businesses. See also Baskaran, supra note 1 (advocating for municipality created 
“Economic Justice Incubators,” instead of relying on 501(c)(3) nonprofits to support the entre-
preneurial aspirations of returning citizens). 
227 See supra text accompanying notes 184–95. 
228 Caron Beesley, How to Estimate the Cost of Starting a Business from Scratch, MINORITY 
BUS. DEV. AGENCY U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
https://www.mbda.gov/news/blog/2011/11/how-estimate-cost-starting-business-scratch (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
229 Id. (citing an Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation study from 2009 that asserted the average 
cost of starting a new business from scratch was just over $30,000). 
230 The annual salary of a fulltime employee at the federal minimum wage rate of $7.25 working 
a forty-hour work week could be as high as $15,080.00, before taxes. (($7.25) x (8 hours per 
day) x (5 days per week) x (52 weeks per year)); See also Tina Amo, How Much Money Will 
You Make Working a Minimum Wage Job?, HOUSTON CHRON., https://work.chron.com/much-
money-make-working-minimum-wage-job-20222.html (last visited March 9, 2020). There have 
been movements in recent years to increase minimum wages nationwide. Jacob Pramuk & John 
W. Schoen, House Democrats Prepare to Push for $15 Federal Minimum Wage, Setting up 
Clash with Big Businesses, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2018, 12:44 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/11/house-democrats-will-push-for-15-per-hour-federal-mini-
mum-wage.html. 
231 Lyles-Chockley, supra note 200, at 275. 
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There is already precedent for federal government funding of 
reentry programs, although not on the same scale as proposed here.232 
The Second Chance Act authorizes federal grants to governmental and 
nonprofit organizations seeking to improve the reentry process.233 The 
act has funded many initiatives, including alternative courts, expanded 
access to substance abuse treatment, and career training for inmates.234  
Given SBD programs would be started from scratch, and not just 
through an expansion of existing programs, the financial requirements 
would likely be very different (and much more extensive) than what The 
Second Chance Act has historically supported.235 However, The Second 
Chance Act, or something like it, may be one place to begin looking for 
financial resources.236 
B. POTENTIAL BENEFITS ARE EMPLOYMENT, DISRUPTION OF THE 
RECIDIVISM CYCLE, AND REINVIGORATED COMMUNITIES 
The potential benefits of SBD programs, if successful, include 
employment for returning citizens shortly after leaving prison, addi-
tional support structures for returning citizens during the process of 
reentry, and the opportunity for returning citizens to invest in and give 
back to their communities.237 When returning citizens reenter civilian 
life they face collateral consequences, employment discrimination,238 
and a steep unemployment rate,239 despite employment being critical to 
returning citizen success.240 The result is a cycle of incarceration, unem-
ployment, and recidivism.241 By offering returning citizens employment 
promptly upon starting reentry, SBD programs would help break the vi-
cious cycle of unemployment and recidivism and allow returning citi-
zens to eschew reliance on time consuming remedies, such as Title VII 
                                                            
232 See infra text accompanying notes 232–34. 
233 Second Chance Act Grant Program, THE NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., https://csgjustice-
center.org/nrrc/projects/second-chance-act/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2018). 
234 See Lisa A. Rich, A Federal Certificate of Rehabilitation Program: Providing Federal 
Ex-Offenders More Opportunity for Successful Reentry, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 249, 260 
(2016). 
235 An additional drawback is that the Second Chance Act requires recipients to be 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organization. Baskaran, supra note 1, at 326. 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 232–34. 
237 See supra Part-II; See infra text accompanying notes 238–65. 
238 Ewald & Smith, supra note 30, at 145–46; Lyles-Chockley, supra note 200, at 267–68; 
Mullings, supra note 26, at 265. 
239 Couloute & Kopf, supra note 66. 
240 Mullings, supra note 26, at 267; PETERSILIA, supra note 51, at 112; Flake, supra note 60, 
at 63. 
241 See supra Part II. 
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claims.242 Breaking that cycle and decreasing recidivism should also 
lessen the collateral damage families and communities suffer.243 Return-
ing citizens will return to society with a job that financially supports 
them,244 in addition to a work place that surrounds them with coworkers 
and bosses who understand the struggles of reentry, having gone 
through reentry themselves.245 
Communities would benefit not just from decreased recidivism, 
but from SBD programs serving as a mechanism by which returning 
citizens would bring investment.246 Most incarcerated people come from 
and return to the same neighborhoods,247 and those communities pay a 
steep price for their residents becoming mired in the cycle of incarcera-
tion, unemployment, and recidivism.248 Peter Edelman, the Carmack 
Waterhouse Professor of Law and Public Policy at Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center and the faculty director of the Georgetown Center on 
Poverty and Inequality,249 has proposed several elements that should be 
parts of policies to tackle concentrated poverty.250 The first is to bring 
jobs to neighborhoods that “pay enough to live on,” and the second is 
that job opportunities in regional economies should be made realistic 
possibilities for community members, in part through aggressive job 
training and placement strategies.251 The SBD programs this comment 
has proposed would seek to incorporate Edelman’s elements and bring 
livable wages, job training, and job placement.252 
The utility of the SBD programs this comment proposes can be 
illustrated by considering how they could potentially combat the lack of 
                                                            
242 See supra Part II, Part III-D. 
243 See supra Part II-B, Part II-C(2), (3). 
244 See supra Part IV-A(3). 
245 See supra Part IV-A(2); See also DEP’TS OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, AND PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, EX-
OFFENDER BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM STUDY REPORT 14 (Oct. 1, 2014) (acknowledging 
the value of mentorship to returning citizen entrepreneurs, but not specifically mentors who are 
themselves returning citizens). 
246 See infra text accompanying notes 247–65. 
247 Cadora et al., supra note 94, at 285. 
248 See supra Part II-C(3). 
249 Peter B. Edelman, GEORGETOWN LAW https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/peter-b-
edelman/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2019). 
250 See infra text accompanying note 247. 
251 Peter Edelman, Our History with Concentrated Poverty, INVESTING IN WHAT WORKS FOR 
AM. CMTYS. http://www.whatworksforamerica.org/ideas/our-history-with-concentrated-pov-
erty/#.XbJUqraZN0s (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). Edelman points out that simply creating 
jobs has historically failed as a standalone approach to neighborhood revitalization, so it is 
important that SBD programs not be seen as “fix-all” for disadvantaged communities. Id. 
252 See supra Part IV-A(1). 
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access to healthy food in Baltimore, Maryland.253 Food deserts or 
“Healthy Food Priority Areas,”254 areas where no healthy food options 
are available, plague many low-income communities.255 A 2015 study 
found a quarter of Baltimore’s residents, or 158,271 people, lived in a 
food desert, 30% of Baltimore’s school-aged children lived in food de-
serts, and 35% of black Baltimoreans lived in food deserts.256 The per-
centage of black residents living in food deserts was “disproportionately 
higher than all other racial and ethnic groups.”257 Only 8% of white res-
idents lived in food deserts.258 A 2018 follow up study determined that 
while there had been some progress made, including about 5,000 fewer 
residents living in Healthy Food Priority Areas due to the opening of a 
new supermarket, children were the most likely of any age group to in 
live in a Priority Area (28.3%) and black residents were still the most 
likely racial or ethnic group to live in a Priority Area (31.5%).259 
A hypothetical SBD program, structured in the way this com-
ment proposes,260 would identify returning citizens interested in devel-
oping a grocery business and assist them through the process of realiz-
ing this project.261 The hypothetical SBD program would help the 
returning citizens develop the necessary business plans, ensure the re-
turning citizens had access to the training needed, and provide the fi-
nancial assistance needed to get the business started.262 Once the busi-
ness was up and running under the direction of returning citizens who 
                                                            
253 See infra text accompanying notes 254–65. 
254 During conversations with Baltimore community groups, residents, and national leaders 
it was determined “food desert” has negative connotations, and in its place some now use 
“Healthy Food Priority Area.” Caitlin Misiaszek, et al., Baltimore City’s Food Environment: 
2018 Report, JOHN HOPKINS CTR. FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE 11 (Jan. 2018), 
https://clf.jhsph.edu/sites/default/files/2019-01/baltimore-city-food-environment-2018-re-
port.pdf. “Food desert” had been used in the earlier 2015 Baltimore City study, before being 
replaced in the 2018 follow up study. Id. 
255 Michele Ver Ploeg, Access to Affordable, Nutritious Food is Limited in “Food Deserts,” 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-
waves/2010/march/access-to-affordable-nutritious-food-is-limited-in-food-deserts/. 
256 Amanda Behrens Buczynski et al., Mapping Baltimore City’s Food Environment: 2015 
Report, JOHN HOPKINS CTR. FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE 23 (June 2015), 
https://clf.jhsph.edu/sites/default/files/2019-02/Baltimore-Food-Environment-Report-2015-
1.pdf. 
257  Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Misiaszek et al., supra note 254, at 17. 
260 See supra Part IV-A. 
261 See supra Part IV-A(1). 
262 Four factors contributing to an area being designated a Healthy Food Priority Area are 1) 
supply of healthy food, 2) household income, 3) vehicle availability, 4) distance to supermarket. 
Misiaszek et al., supra note 254, at 12–13. SBD program’s financial support will likely be 
particularly important for a business, like the one in this example, located in a low-income 
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had come through the SBD program, the SBD program would identify 
returning citizens working with the SBD program who may be inter-
ested in working for the established business.263 The hypothetical SBD 
program would then place those returning citizens with the created busi-
ness, in accordance with the requirements set out above.264 If both the 
hypothetical SBD program and grocery store were successful then, the-
oretically, this would provide jobs for the employees265 and a source of 
healthy food for the community. 
C. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS 
SBD programs would not be without potential drawbacks, such 
as cost and perpetuation of stigma.266 Funding the small businesses and 
supplementing employer salaries will not be inexpensive and may re-
quire tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per business in the early 
stages.267 High price tags could make SBD programs a hard sell.268 The 
cycle of recidivism, however, alone has tremendous cost for the taxpay-
ers, costing millions of dollars per year.269 “Recidivism-reducing pro-
grams” can, however, reduce recidivism and the amounts of money the 
state must spend on incarceration.270 Further study and experimentation 
is needed to see whether SBD programs could be such successful “re-
cidivism-reducing programs” that help reduce incarceration spending. 
If successful, it is hoped such programs, despite their costs, would help 
                                                            
neighborhood. See Maurice Kulger, et al., Entrepreneurship in Low-Income Areas, OFF. OF 
ADVOCACY U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMINISTRATION, 6 (September 2017) (stating “[b]y the same to-
ken, low-income urban neighborhoods face a similar continuing cycle of poverty and social 
problems due to the lack of profitable businesses and jobs. Issues around higher crime rates, 
poor infrastructure, poor employee skills, and barriers to accessing debt and equity capital create 
major obstacles to the growth of businesses.) (citing William Gartner and Subodh Bhat, Envi-
ronmental and Ownership Characteristics of Small Businesses and their Impact on Develop-
ment, 38 J. OF SMALL BUS. MGMT. 14 (2000)). 
263 See supra Part IV-A(1). 
264 See supra Part IV-A(1). 
265 See supra Part IV-A(1). 
266 See infra text accompanying notes 267–71. 
267 See supra Part IV-A(3). 
268 Washington, D.C.’s unrealized Incarceration to Incorporation Entrepreneurship Program 
called for a $10 million non-lapsing fund to be used to implement, operate, and administer 
the program. Smith, supra note 195; see also 63 D.C. Reg. 10771 (Aug. 18, 2016) (repealed 
2019). 
269 See supra Part II-C(4). 
270 See generally Returns on Investments in Recidivism-reducing Programs, THE COUNCIL OF 
ECONOMIC ADVISERS (May 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/05/Returns-on-Investments-in-Recidivism-Reducing-Programs.pdf (last visited 
March 8, 2020). 
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reduce the need for incarceration spending, in addition to providing jobs 
and bringing businesses to underinvested-in-communities.271 
Another foreseeable drawback of the hypothesized SBD pro-
grams is that they may do little to mitigate the stigma and employer 
distrust returning citizens face. Incarceration carries a social stigma for 
the incarcerated272 as returning citizens are relegated to a kind of under-
class.273 Meanwhile, employers may fear hiring returning citizens be-
cause they believe they have a greater risk of workplace misconduct, are 
an unstable workforce, simply perform poorly, or expose the employer 
to negligent hiring lawsuits.274 By design, SBD programs seek to direct 
returning citizens away from having to apply to employers who would 
discriminate against returning citizens because of those stigmas and 
fears.275 The SBD programs this comment proposes do this because they 
want to offer returning citizens a route to employment that does not in-
volve relying on their records remaining hidden or suing employers.276 
If, however, SBD programs are directing returning citizens away from 
such employers then it is conceivable that the opportunities for returning 
citizens to work for employers and disprove employer assumptions 
about the dangers of hiring them will be reduced.277 Therefore, it is im-
portant to conceive of SBD programs not as the returning citizen unem-
ployment silver bullet, but as one potential tool, among many,278 which 
could be used to mitigate the harms of returning citizen unemployment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This comment seeks to offer an alternative employment route to 
returning citizens that does not require them to face down employment 
discrimination or launch lawsuits.279 There are other options returning 
citizens can use to mitigate the impacts of collateral consequences and 
                                                            
271 See supra Part IV-B. 
272 Lyles-Chockley, supra note 200, at 291. 
273 See Nonviolent Drug Convictions: Stakeholders’ Views on Potential Actions to Address 
Collateral Consequences. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 8 (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687003.pdf. 
274 See Dylan Minor, et al., Criminal Background and Job Performance, 7 IZA J. OF LAB. 
POL’Y 1, 5 (2017). Although research into whether those fears are grounded is limited, the 
Minor study concludes that many concerns are not, but that some are. Id. at 18. 
275 See supra text accompanying note 180; See also text accompanying note 271. 
276 See supra Part III. 
277 Admittedly, such a result cannot be quantified when there has been a dearth of study on 
programs similar to the SBD programs proposed here. 
278 See supra Part III. 
279 See supra Part IV. 
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employment discrimination, but they all possess limitations.280 This 
comment has shown the damage that results from denying returning cit-
izens access to employment, has considered existing recourses, and has 
proposed an additional recourse.281 SBD programs would benefit return-
ing citizens, their families, their communities, and society by breaking 
the recidivism cycle and offering returning citizens a direct path to em-
ployment.282 
 
                                                            
280 See supra Parts III–IV. 
281 See supra I–IV. 
282 See supra Part IV. 
